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TRANSCRIPT: JURISDICTIONAL AND TRIGGER MECHANISMS
Mark S. Ellis*
The Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western 
Reserve University sponsored a symposium, “The International Criminal 
Court and the Crime of Aggression,” on September 26, 2008. The purpose 
of the conference was to assist the ICC Assembly of State Parties’ Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression create a workable definition of 
aggression and the conditions under which the Court could exercise its ju-
risdiction over it. This transcript contains the remarks of Mark Ellis, who 
moderated a panel discussion featuring Professor David Scheffer, former 
U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, and Elizabeth 
Wilmshurs, former Deputy Legal Advisor for the Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office (U.K.).  
INTRODUCTION
I’ve never been a strong proponent of including the crime of ag-
gression within the Court’s jurisdiction. My fear has been that by including 
the crime, it will unnecessarily dilute the important and current focus on the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. I simply do 
not feel that these key crimes are sufficiently rooted in the mindset of the 
international community to add yet another complicated distracting crime. 
We should instead assist the Court in ensuring that the current three core 
crimes remain the central focus for the Court so that we can advance the 
goal of putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes. The Court is seven years old 
and has only recently started its first trial (The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo). The Court’s recent decision to indict and issue an arrest 
warrant against a sitting head of state (The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al-Bashir) also places enormous pressure on the perceived legiti-
macy of the Court. And yet, we are spending an extraordinary amount of 
time on possibly burdening the Court with a new crime that will be contro-
versial and likely unworkable. Finally, I disagree with the argument that the 
crime of aggression is the ultimate international crime. Genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and gross violations of the international humanitarian law 
remain, for me, the “ultimate” international crimes. Unless the crime of 
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aggression leads to one of these “associated” crimes, then I simply do not 
see the crime as having reached this same egregious level of criminality.   
OUTLINE OF THE TRIGGER MECHANISM DEBATE
What I will do is very briefly frame the trigger/filter mechanism de-
bate as presented within the Special Working Group on the Crime of Ag-
gression (SWGCA). The SWGCA has focused on three topics (baskets): (1) 
the crime of aggression—defining the individual’s conduct/the leadership 
clause;1  (2) the definition of the act of aggression—defining the act of the 
state;2 and (3) the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.3
It is this third basket that is the focus of discussion for this panel. 
We need to bear in mind that definitional issues and jurisdictional condi-
tions are inter-related; that is, the agreed upon definition may impose a 
threshold requirement, thereby limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to cases.  
WHO SHOULD DETERMINE WHEN AN ACT OF AGGRESSION HAS 
OCCURRED?
The main debate in negotiations over the conditions for the exercise 
of jurisdiction focuses on who should determine whether an act of aggres-
sion has been committed, and whether this must be determined by an out-
side body before the Court may proceed.  
The Trigger mechanisms of Article 13 include: (1) State Party refer-
rals to the Prosecution; (2) referral to the Prosecution by the U.N. Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; and (3) the Prosecutor’s 
own initiation of an investigation and prosecution.4
Do these mechanisms apply to the crime of aggression? Many states 
have said “yes.”5 However, other states have said that Article 13 would not 
fully apply to the crime of aggression due to the “special nature” of the 
crime;6 these states have called for the exclusive competence of the U.N. 
Security Council in determining whether an act of aggression has been 
committed before the Court can proceed with an investigation.  Professor 
Mark Stein has argued that additional powers should be granted to the Secu-
1 International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/35 (Jan. 29–Feb. 1, 2007), annex II, ¶ 6, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/Report_SWGCA_English.pdf.  
2 Id. ¶¶ 14–15. 
3 Id. ¶¶ 23–29. 
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
5 See Irina Kaye Muller-Schieke, Defining the Crime of Aggression Under the Statute of 
the Internationl Criminal Court, 14 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (2001). 
6 See id. at 420. 
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rity Council allowing it to call for a permanent halt to proceedings or even 
to vacate charges and expunge corrections set by the Court.  These ap-
proaches would certainly be regarded as a “major filter.” 
The issue of prior determination has been central to the debate on 
the exercise of jurisdiction and the trigger/filter mechanism. One of the 
main reasons advanced for the necessity of prior determination by an out-
side body is that it would avoid the politicization of the Court.  
Thus, determining the relationship between the Security Council 
and the Court is the most perplexing challenge in adopting a trigger mecha-
nism. To date, there has been no sign of compromise by the permanent 
members of the Security Council on this issue. The Permanent five mem-
bers continue to view the Council as having exclusivity to trigger the 
Court’s jurisdiction by determining that a state has committed an act of ag-
gression.
SHOULD THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXCLUSIVELY DETERMINE WHEN
AGGRESSION HAS OCCURRED?
Taking into account Article 5(2), which states that the crime of ag-
gression must be determined in accordance “with the relevant provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations,”7 raises the issue as to whether the ICC 
depends on a prior Security Council finding of an act of aggression in order 
to proceed with the investigation and prosecution of a crime. As Ambassa-
dor Scheffer has sated, “the Security Council must act before any alleged 
crime of aggression can be prosecuted against an individual by the ICC.” 
The argument is that under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the Secu-
rity Council has exclusive competence to determine an act of state aggres-
sion, and the Court cannot proceed with a case without this determination 
by the Security Council.8 Again, as Ambassador Scheffer argues, Article 39 
“gives clear, perhaps sole authority for the Security Council to decide on 
aggression.” Once a determination is made, the ICC Prosecution could in-
vestigate any individual who might be responsible in a criminal context. 
As concluded by Ambassador Scheffer, the Council would simply 
not accept a situation in which “the ICC moves forward without deference 
to the Council’s overall authority with respect to threats to peace.” 
However, others argue that Article 5(2) does not require a prior de-
termination by the Security Council and the relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council is regulated in other parts of the Statute. The ar-
gument is that the Security Council has primary, but not exclusive authority 
to determine an act of aggression; the absence of a prior Security Council 
determination would not preclude the Court from proceeding with a case. 
7 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(2).  
8 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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A counter argument is that since the Security Council may already 
refer a situation to the Court under Article 13, and also defer an investiga-
tion by the Court under Article 16, an additional provision for a prior de-
termination of an act of aggression is unnecessary. 
For the sake of argument, let us accept that the preferred way for 
the Court to proceed is to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
after a determination of state aggression has been made by the Security 
Council. This exclusivity mandate is based on Article 39 of the U.N. Char-
ter: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression . . . .”9 It is argued that this 
exclusive prior determination by Security Council prevents the politiciza-
tion of the Court, which could occur if the work of the Court becomes 
closely linked to the work of the Security Council. 
Others argue that all existing crimes under the Statute have a politi-
cal element. As a treaty-based obligation, the Rome Statute is not binding 
on third parties, unless they have agreed to cooperate with the Court.  
DOES THE SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL AUTHORITY PER SE BLUR THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATE PARTIES AND NON-STATE PARTIES ON THE 
DETERMINATION OF AGGRESSION?
Still others have suggested that Article 39 does not say the Security 
Council has exclusive power to make the determination. Furthermore, if the 
Security Council had to trigger the Court to proceed, it would erode the 
sovereign equality of states and place the Security Council in an inappropri-
ate judicial role. Is it permissible to allow permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council to exclusively make a determination for or against criminal 
proceedings that may be of interest to them? In essence they become the 
judge and jury in their own case. In the words of John Dugard, such an ex-
clusive scheme is “unduly deferential to the veto power of the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council.”10  Claus Kress has argued that any 
rule that would subject legal proceedings for an alleged crime of aggression 
to the veto power of each of the five permanent members should be rejected 
as fundamentally flawed. 
SHOULD THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DETERMINE WHEN AGGRESSION HAS 
OCCURRED?
Another issue that has been raised is whether other bodies should 
hold the competence to determine whether or not a state has committed an 
9 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
10 John Dugard, Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court, 56 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 329, 336 (1997). 
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act of aggression. For instance, would it be appropriate for the General As-
sembly to possess this responsibility? The General Assembly has, in six 
situations, declared certain acts as “aggression.” For example, China against 
Korea in 1951,11 the occupation of Namibia by South Africa in 1963,12 and 
Israel against Iran, Lebanon, and the Palestinian People.13 Resolutions of the 
U.N. General Assembly are non-binding but are considered highly persua-
sive. Most issues are decided by a simple majority, but designated important 
issues would require a two-thirds vote, which likely would be the case in 
determining act of aggression. Of course, some experts (e.g., Ben Ferencz) 
believe that the General Assembly would be more politically driven than the 
Security Council.14
SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DETERMINE WHEN 
AGGRESSION OCCURS?
Another judicial body that could hold decision-making authority is 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ’s role would be to deter-
mine whether or not a state has committed an act of aggression—both in the 
form of judgements, and in the form of advisory opinions (e.g., Nicaragua 
case, DRC case). It could also play a role by providing an advisory opinion 
at the request of the General Assembly or the Security Council. The ICJ 
would reach a preliminary decision on state aggression following a determi-
nation by the Security Council that a threat to or breach of peace has oc-
curred. This approach has been advocated by Ambassador Scheffer. 
11 G.A. Res. 498 (V), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/327 (Feb. 5, 1951). 
12 G.A. Res. 14/1, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-14/1 (Sept. 20, 1986). 
13 G.A. Res. 36/27, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/56 (Nov. 13, 1981). 
14 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggres-
sion, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV., 551, 563 (2007). 
